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ABSTRACT. How should the contrastivist formulate closure? That is,
given that knowledge is a ternary contrastive state Kspq (s knows that p
rather than q), how does this state extend under entailment? In what follows,
I will identify adequacy conditions for closure, criticize the extant invari-
antist and contextualist closure schemas, and provide a contrastive schema
based on the idea of extending answers. I will conclude that only the con-
trastivist can adequately formulate closure.
1. CONTRASTIVISM AND CLOSURE
There are two main assumptions I will be making that should
be ﬂagged from the start. First, I will be assuming a contras-
tive theory of knowledge.1 That is, I will be assuming that
knowledge is a ternary contrastive state Kspq (where s is the
subject, p is the proposition known, and q is the contrast
proposition), whose evidential component Espq is the elimina-
tion of the q-worlds. This assumption will not be directly
defended here. Though what follows may be considered an
indirect defense, insofar as contrastivism proves needed for
an adequate formulation of closure.
Second, I will be assuming that some form of closure
holds. After all, (i) the idea that knowledge extends under
entailment is intuitively compelling (Feldman, 1995); (ii)
mathematical knowledge, as based on proof, presupposes
such extension (Williamson, 2000); and (iii) denying closure
allows abominable conjunctions such as ‘‘I do not know that
I am not a (handless) brain-in-a-vat, but I know that I have
hands’’ (DeRose, 1995). This assumption will not be further
defended here.2 Though what follows may be considered an
indirect defense, insofar as contrastive closure proves safe
from objectionable consequences.
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Putting this together, I will be assuming:
(A1) Contrastivism: The knowledge state is Kspq, where q
is a contrast proposition, and whose evidential com-
ponent Espq is the elimination of the q-worlds.
(A2) Closure: Kspq satisﬁes some closure schema.
So the question becomes, what closure schema holds for the
contrastive state Kspq?
2. BINARY CLOSURE
It will prove useful to begin with closure schemata for binary
Ksp. This will help identify adequacy conditions, illustrate
some useful maneuvers, and reveal problems with binarity.
The simplest binary closure schema runs:
ð1Þ ðKsp1 & ðp1 ! p2ÞÞ ! Ksp2
In words: if s knows that p1 and p1 entails p2, then s knows
that p2. In short, knowledge is closed under entailment.
What can be said for 1 is that it preserves the intuitions
behind closure. That is, it provides a plausible rendering of
how knowledge extends under entailment, explains how proof
extends knowledge, and blocks abominable conjunctions.
These make 1 a worthy candidate to be a closure schema.
This yields three adequacy conditions on closure:
(C1) An adequate closure schema should provide a plau-
sible rendering of how knowledge extends under
entailment.
(C2) An adequate closure schema should explain how
proof extends knowledge.
(C3) An adequate closure schema should block abomina-
ble conjunctions.To fail C1–C3 is to be unsuited for
the role of closure.
What can be said against 1 is that it faces counterexamples.
First, s might fail to see some consequences of what he
knows. We are not logically omniscient. Second, s might see
some consequence but still fail to believe it. Third, s might
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see and believe some consequence, but on the wrong basis.
Perhaps s only forms his belief from reading tea leaves. Thus
1 is false. This yields three further adequacy conditions:
(C4) An adequate closure schema should block lack-of-
omniscience counterexamples.
(C5) An adequate closure schema should block lack-of-
belief counterexamples.
(C6) An adequate closure schema should block irrational-
basis counterexamples.
To fail C4–C6 is to be inapplicable to human knowledge.
An improved binary closure schema runs:
ð2Þ ðKsp1& Ksðp1 ! p2ÞÞ ! Ksp2
In words: if s knows that p1 and s knows that p1 entails p2,
then s knows that p2. In short, knowledge is closed under
known entailment.3
What can be said for 2 is that it satisﬁes C1–C4. That is, 2
preserves the virtues of 1 with respect to C1–C3.4 And by
requiring that the entailment be known, 2 blocks lack-of-
omniscience counterexamples, thus satisfying C4. But what
can be said against 2 is that is fails C5–C6. That is, 2 remains
subject to counterexample in cases where s fails to believe
that p2, or s believes that p2 on an irrational basis (perhaps
by ignoring the proof in favor of trusting the tea leaves).
Perhaps the best binary closure schema revises the conse-
quent of 1, replacing Ksp2 with Esp2, where E is the eviden-
tial component of K:
ð3Þ ðKsp1ðp1 ! p2ÞÞ ! Esp2
That is, position to know is closed under entailment, where
position to know is understood as satisfying the evidential
component of knowledge. So if Esp2, then s has propositional




What can be said for 3 is that is satisﬁes C1–C6. Essen-
tially, 3 preserves the virtues of 1 with respect to C1–C3. And
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3 satisﬁes C4–C6 because failures of omniscience, belief, and
basing are no impediment to E. Thus the progression from 1
to 3 reveals how to surmount the omniscience, belief, and
basing problems. The binary theorist might well rest here.
What can be said against 3 (and binary closure generally)
is that it engenders skeptical paradox. To begin with, 3 is
incompatible with A1. 3 is formulated for Ksp, not for the
contrastive Kspq. Of course, the binary theorist will hardly
ﬂinch. But A1 is an assumption of the current discussion (§1).
Further, 3 precludes epistemic modesty. Surely we possess
modest knowledge of the external world. For instance, Moore
knows that he has hands. He need only look. And surely we
also suffer modest ignorance of the external world. For
instance, Moore does not know that he is not a brain-in-a-
vat. He may look all he wants, but it wont help. But 3 forces
our modest knowledge and modest ignorance into conﬂict,
driving us to dogmatism or skepticism.6
Finally, 3 mistreats knowledge-whether. Intuitively, Moore
knows whether he has hands or stumps. As to whether he has
hands or stumps, he can tell by looking. This is an easy ques-
tion. And intuitively, Moore does not know whether he has
hands or vat-images of hands. As to whether he has hands or
vat-images of hands, he cant tell – theyd look the same to
him. This is an (impossibly) diﬃcult question.
Yet 3, together with the standard binary view of knowl-
edge-whether, forces these intuitive claims into conﬂict. The
standard binary view of knowledge-whether reduces it to Ksp,
where p is the true answer to the whether-question.7 So (given
that Moore in fact has hands), his knowledge of whether he
has hands or stumps is his knowledge that he has hands. This
alleged knowledge would position Moore to know that he is
not a brain-in-a-vat. This would position him to know whe-
ther he has hands or is a brain-in-a-vat, which of course he is
in no position to know.
This yields three further adequacy conditions:
(C7) An adequate closure schema should concern the
contrastive Kspq state.
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(C8) An adequate closure schema should preserve episte-
mic modesty.
(C9) An adequate closure schema should ﬁt knowledge-
whether.
C7–C9 are connected. Moores knowledge as to whether he has
hands or stumps, and his ignorance as to whether he has hands
or vat-images of hands, comprises his modest epistemic stand-
ing. There are some questions he can answer, and some he cant.
This modest standing is expressible by going explicit about the
contrasts: Moore knows that he has hands rather than stumps,
but Moore does not know that he has hands rather than
vat-images of hands. Here is the path between dogmatism and
skepticism. To fail C7–C9 is to fall into skeptical paradox.
3. CONTEXTUALIST CLOSURE
It will prove useful to turn to the standard contextualist for-
mulations of closure, since contextualism and contrastivism
are close relatives. This will help identify further adequacy
conditions for closure, illustrate more useful ideas, and reveal
problems for the contextualist.
The standard contextualist view is that closure holds as
long as the relevant alternatives are ﬁxed. Here is the simplest
meta-linguistic implementation of this idea:
(4) If an utterance of ‘‘s knows that p1’’ is true in con-
text c1 with relevant alternatives R, and p1 entails p2,
then an utterance of ‘‘s knows that p2’’ is true in any
context c2 with relevant alternatives R.
In short, the truth of knowledge ascriptions extends under
entailment, as long as the relevant alternatives hold ﬁxed.8
While contextualists are typically silent about the knowl-
edge relation, they are perhaps best understood as epistemic
pluralists.9 For the contextualist, ‘‘knows’’ is an indexical that
ranges over a plurality of epistemic relations KR. Each set of
relevant alternatives R is paired with an epistemic relation
KR. So 4 can be expressed in the object-language as:
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ð5Þ ðKRsp1 & ðp1 ! p2ÞÞ ! KRsp2
In words: if s knowsR that p1, and p1 entails p2, then s
knowsR that p2.
Of course, 5 fails C4–C6. The omniscience, lack-of-belief,
and irrational-basing problems now arise for each KR rela-
tion. But 3 reveals how to solve these problems. So putting 3
and 5 together, and continuing on in the object-language,
yields the best contextualist closure schema:
ð6Þ ðKRsp1& ðp1 ! p2ÞÞ ! ERsp2
That is, position to knowR is closed under entailment.
10
What can be said in favor of 6 is that it satisﬁes C1–C7 and
C9. C1 is satisﬁed insofar as the intuitively compelling idea of
closure is preserved, in that all epistemic relations extend under
entailment. C2 is satisﬁed since proof extends all epistemic rela-
tions. C3 is satisﬁed since abominable conjunctions are blocked
(there is no single epistemic relation KR for which the abomina-
ble conjunction holds. C4–C6 are satisﬁed by borrowing the
positioning maneuver from 3. C7 is satisﬁed since it is trivial to
translate an indexed plurality of binary relations KRsp, into the
contrastive relation Kspq, by taking q to be the disjunction of
the members of R. And C9 is satisﬁed as long as the content of
the whether-question is permitted to set the relevant alterna-
tives.11 This yields Moores knowing{stumps} that he has hands
and his not knowing{vat} that he has hands, which are distinct
epistemic relations, and so not forced into conﬂict by 6. Thus
the contextualist can claim to skirt skeptical paradox.
But what can be said against 6 is that it fails C8, and that it is
insufﬁcient for many cases of knowledge expansion under
deduction. Starting with C8, suppose that Moore knowsR that
he has hands. Then by 6, he is in position to knowR that he is
not a brain-in-a-vat. Thus all the KR relations are either dog-
matic or skeptical—none are modest.12 Further, the dogmatic
epistemic relations seem to involve cheap knowledge without
any evidential basis. Suppose, for instance, that Moore knowsR
that he has hands, where R = {that Moore has stumps}.
To achieve this state, Moore must eliminate the alternative of
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having stumps. But now consider Moores alleged state of
knowingR that he is not a brain-in-a-vat. Not-being-a-brain-in-
a-vat is no longer an alternative to having stumps (rather, it is a
super-case of it). There is no relevant alternative to not-bring-
a-brain-in-a-vat in R. So to achieve this alleged state, it seems
that Moore need not eliminate anything. But surely epistemic
achievements require an evidential basis.13
6 is also insufﬁcient for many cases of knowledge expansion
under deduction. As a ﬁrst example, suppose I know that the
murderer is Scarlet rather than Peacock or Mustard. Then I
should be in position to know that the murderer is Scarlet
rather than Peacock. (Equivalently in this context: suppose I
know whether the murderer is Scarlet or Peacock or Mustard,
then I should be in position to know whether the murderer is
Scarlet or Peacock.) After all, if I can eliminate both the Pea-
cock and Mustard alternatives, surely I can eliminate only the
Peacock alternative. In general, one should be able to extend
knowledgeR1 that p, to knowledgeR2 that p, where R1R2.
But 6 does not apply because R varies. My knowledge{Peacock,
Mustard} that the murderer is Scarlet is disconnected from any
knowledge{Peacock} that the murderer is Scarlet.
As a second example of the insufﬁciency of 6, suppose I
know that the murderer is Scarlet or Peacock, rather than
Mustard, and that I know that the murderer is Scarlet or
Green, rather than Mustard. Then I should be in position to
know that the murderer is Scarlet rather than Mustard.
(Equivalently in this context: suppose I know whether the
murderer is (i) Scarlet or Green, or (ii) Mustard, and that I
know whether the murderer is (i) Scarlet or Peacock, or (ii)
Mustard; then I should be in position to know whether the
murderer is Scarlet or Mustard.) After all, I can eliminate the
Mustard possibility throughout. In general, one should be
able to combine knowledgeR that p1, with knowledgeR that
p2, to knowR that p1 and p2. But 6 does not apply because
neither p1 nor p2 individually entails p1 and p2 — 6 has no
mechanism for multi-premise closure.14
As a third example of the insufﬁciency of 6, suppose I know
that the murderer is Scarlet rather than Peacock, and that I
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know that the murderer is Scarlet rather than Mustard. Then I
should be in a position to know that the murderer is Scarlet
rather than Peacock or Mustard. (Equivalently in this context:
suppose I know whether the murderer is Scarlet or Peacock,
and that I know whether the murderer is Scarlet or Mustard;
then I should be in a position to know whether the murderer
is Scarlet or Peacock or Mustard.) After all, if I can eliminate
both of the Peacock and Mustard disjuncts individually, surely
I can eliminate their disjunction. In general, one should be
able to combine knowledgeR1 that p, with knowledgeR2 that p,
to knowR1[R2 that p. But 6 does not apply because R varies,
and also because there are multiple premises.
These last three points yield three further adequacy condi-
tions:
(C10) An adequate closure schema should allow extension
from knowledgeR1 that p, to the position to
knowR2 that p, where R1R2.
(C11) An adequate closure schema should allow extension
from knowledgeR that p1 and knowledgeR that p2,
to the position to knowR that p1 and p2.
(C12) An adequate closure schema should allow extension
from knowledgeR1 that p and knowledgeR2 that p,
to the position to knowR1[R2 that p.
What has gone wrong is that the contextualist has added a
parameter—the R-subscripts—but has only implemented a
closure schema built for Ksp.15 To fail C10–C12 is to be
insuﬃcient to cover deductive extensions of knowledge.
4. KNOWLEDGE AND ANSWERS
So how should the contrastivist formulate closure, to satisfy
C1–C12? To begin, it will prove helpful to connect contras-
tive knowledge with the ability to answer questions. There
are three main points of connection. First, {p, q} spans the
denotation of a question. A question denotes a set of multiple
alternatives—all well-formed questions are multiple-choice
questions.16 The possible answers to a question form multiple
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cells in a region of logical space. Questions partition the pos-
sibilities. Thus the question of whether Moore has hands or
stumps can be diagrammed as:
So contrastive knowledge is equivalent to question-relative
knowledge: Kspq is equivalent to KspQ, where Q is the question
?:{p, q}. For instance, Moores knowledge that he has hands ra-
ther than stumps is equivalent to his knowledge that he has hands
relative to the question of whether he has hands or stumps.17
A second point of connection between contrastive knowing
and answering is that the contrasts, when left implicit, are
determined by the question under discussion. A context can
be modeled as a set of alternatives—those alternatives that
are the live options under discussion.18 So when a knowl-
edge ascription is inexplicit as to the value of q, q defaults to
the disjunction of non-p options under discussion.19
A third point of connection between contrastive knowing
and answering is that the elimination of the relevant alterna-
tives constitutes the ability to answer. That is, as per A1, the
evidential component of contrastive knowledge is the elimina-
tion of the alternatives. Which is what it takes to be able to an-
swer. After all, imagine facing a multiple-choice question, and
eliminating all but one option. One would be in an ideal posi-
tion to answer.20 Thus contrastivism implements Castan˜edas
idea that, ‘‘knowledge involves essentially the non-doxastic
component of a power to answer a question’’ (1980, p. 194).
All knowing is knowing the answer.
So contrastive knowledge can be represented via cells in a
region of logical space, with all but one cell crossed out. So
the following represents the evidential basis for Moores
knowledge that he has hands rather than stumps:
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Thus the question of how the contrastivist should formulate
closure may be usefully transformed into the question of how
the ability to answer questions extends.
5. EXTENDING ANSWERS
So how does the ability to answer questions extend? Suppose
that s is able to answer Q1 = ?:{p1, q1, q2}, via p1:
Then what other questions is s is in a position to answer?
First, consider the question Q2 = ?:{p1p2, q1, q2}, where
p2 concerns a hitherto irrelevant region of logical space:
Since we are given that s is able to eliminate q1 and q2, s is in
the position represented by:
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This shows that s is able to answer Q2 via p1p2.
Second, consider the alleged question Q3 = ?:{p1~p1, q1,
q2}. Here the ﬁrst cell {p1~p1} covers the others. So this is
not a genuine question, since a genuine question requires a
partition. Thus s is not able to answer Q3 via p1~p1, since
Q3 is not a genuine question that can be answered.
What the extension from Q1 to Q2 shows is that Kspq
extends under p-expansion. This has a topological rationale,
which is that any super-region of an uneliminated region is
an uneliminated region.21 What the failure of extension from
Q1 to Q3 shows is that extension under p-expansion is limited
by q. If p expands to overlap q at any point, then what
results is no longer a genuine question, and so no longer
something capable of being answered.22 Putting this together
yields a ﬁrst closure schema:
(Expand-pÞ ðKsp1q & ðp1 ! p2Þ & fp2g \ fqg ¼ [Þ ! Esp2q
In short, position to know is closed under q-bounded expan-
sion at p.
Third, consider the question Q4 = {p1, q1}:
Given that s is able to answer Q1, s can eliminate q1, so s is
in the position represented by:
This shows that s is able to answer Q4 via p1.
Fourth, consider the alleged question Q5 = ?:{p1}. Q5 has
only one cell. So Q5 is not a genuine question, since a genuine
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question requires multiple cells.23 So s is not able to answer Q5
via p1, since Q5 is not a genuine question that can be answered.
What the extension from Q1 to Q4 shows is that Kspq
extends under q-contraction. There is a topological rationale
for this, which is that any subregion of an eliminated region
is an eliminated region.24 What the failure of extension from
Q1 to Q5 shows is that extension under q-contraction is lim-
ited by Ø. If q contracts to nothing, then what results is no
longer a genuine question, and so no longer something capa-
ble of being answered. Putting this together yields a second
closure schema:
(Contract-qÞðKspq1 & ðq2 ! q1Þ & fq2g 6¼ [Þ ! Espq2
In short, position to know is closed under nonempty contrac-
tion at q.
6. COMBINING ANSWERS
So far, Expand-p and Contract-q describe how knowing a sin-
gle answer extends. It remains to describe how knowing multi-
ple answers combines. Here it will suﬃce to consider the case of
knowing two answers, since all (ﬁnite) multiplicities can be ac-
cessed by repeated application of pairwise principles.
So ﬁrst, suppose that s is knowingly able to answer Q1
(Q1 = ?:{p1,q1,q2}) via p1, and that s is knowingly able to an-
swer Q6 (Q6 = ?:{p2,q1,q2}) via p2. From these suppositions
and the factivity of knowledge (Kspq ﬁ p), it follows that
fp1g \ fp2g 6¼ [.25 And it follows that {p1}\{p2} is an uneli-
minated region.26 So s is in the position represented by:27
This shows that s is able to answer Q7 (Q7 = ?: {p1&
p2,q1,q2}) via p1 & p2.
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What the extension from Q1 and Q6 to Q7 shows is that
Ksp1q and Ksp2q states extend under p-intersection. This
yields a third closure schema:
(Intersect-pÞðKsp1q & ðKsp2qÞ ! Esðp1&p2Þq
In short, combined position to know is closed under intersec-
tion at p.
Second, suppose that s is able to answer Q4 (Q4 = ?:{p1,q1})
via p1, and that s is able to answer Q8 (Q8 = ?:{p1,q2}) via
p1. Then by being able to answer Q4, s is in the following
position:
And by being able to answer Q8, s is in the following posi-
tion:
Now consider whether s is able to answer Q1 (Q1 = ?:
{p1,q1,q2}) represented as:
Since s is able to answer Q4, it follows that s can eliminate
q1. And since s is able to answer Q8, it follows that s can
eliminate q2. So s is in position to eliminate both:
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Which is what it takes to be able to answer Q1 via p1.
What the extension from Q4 and Q8 to Q1 shows is that
the Kspq1 and Kspq2 states extend under q-union. This yields
a fourth closure schema:
(Union-qÞðKspq1&Kspq2Þ ! Espðq1 _ q2Þ:
In short, combined position to know is closed under union at q.
7. CONTRASTIVE CLOSURE
So far I have presented 12 adequacy conditions on closure,
and developed four closure schemata. Conjoining these clo-
sure schemata yields contrastive closure:
(7) Contrastive knowledge extends by Expand-p, Contract-
q, Intersect-p, and Union-q.
It remains to show that 7 satisﬁes C1–C12.
Starting with C1–C3, 7 preserves the closure intuitions.
A plausible rendering of how knowledge extends under entail-
ment is provided, as per C1, given the equation of contrastive
knowledge with the ability to answer the question (§4), and a
plausible treatment of how the ability to answer questions ex-
tends (§§5–6). Mathematical proof is allowed to extend
knowledge, as per C2, since a proof can be regarded as
extending the ability to answer questions. To take a trivial
example, suppose I know that 2 + 2 = 4 rather than any
other natural number, and that I prove that 2 + 2 = 4
entails that 2 + 2 = 3 + 1. Then by Expand-p I am in posi-
tion to know that 2 + 2 = 3 + 1 rather than any other nat-
ural number.28 Abominable conjunctions are blocked, as per
C3, since there is no single value of q that can vindicate: ‘‘s
does not know that she is not a brain-in-a-vat [rather than q],
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but s does not that she has hands [rather than q].’’ For the
second conjunct requires that q be eliminable, and the ﬁrst
conjunct requires that q contrast with not being a brain-in-a-
vat. So q would need to be an eliminable case of being a
brain-in-a-vat. Thus there is no such q.
Turning to C4–C6, 7 avoids the counterexamples. By con-
joining principles with Espq consequents, 7 draws on the
maneuver that avoids the counterexamples (§2). Lack of
omniscience, belief-failure, and basing-failure cannot imperil
any component of 7.
Moving to C7–C9, 7 skirts skeptical paradox. 7 ﬁts con-
trastivism directly, as per C7. Epistemic modesty is preserved,
as per C8. By restricting Expand-p so that what is entailed
cannot overlap the contrasts, cases of cheap knowledge with
nothing to eliminate are blocked. Thus one cannot use ones
knowledge that one has hands rather than stumps, to come
to know that one is not a brain-in-a-vat rather than a crea-
ture with stumps.29 And since there is no rule of Replace-q,
one cannot use ones knowledge that one has hands rather
than stumps (Kspq1), to come to know that one has hands
rather than vat-images of hands (Kspq2).
30 So Moore knows
that he has hands rather than stumps, and does not know
that he has hands rather than vat-images of hands. And
knowledge-whether is accommodated, as per C9. Moore
knows whether he has hands or stumps, and does not know
whether he has hands or vat-images of hands.31
Finishing with C10–C12, 7 licenses the needed inferences.
C10 requires the extension from knowledgeR1 that p, to the
position to knowR2 that p, where R1R2. This is what Con-
tract-q licenses. So if I know that the murderer is Scarlet
rather than Peacock or Mustard, then, by Contract-q, I am in
position to know that the murderer is Scarlet rather than
Peacock. C11 requires the extension from knowledgeR that p1
and knowledgeR that p2, to the position to knowR that p1 &
p2. This is what Intersect-p licenses. So if I know that the
murderer is Scarlet or Peacock, rather than Mustard, and I
know that the murderer is Scarlet or Green, rather than Mus-
tard, then, by Intersect-p, I am in position to know that the
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murderer is Scarlet rather than Mustard. C12 requires the ex-
tension from knowledgeR1 that p and knowledgeR2 that p, to
the position to knowR1[R2 that p. This is what Union-q
licenses. So if I know that the murderer is Scarlet rather than
Peacock, and I know that the murderer is Scarlet rather than
Mustard, then I am in a position to know that the murderer
is Scarlet rather than Peacock or Mustard.
No doubt there are further counterexamples to be ﬁelded,
and further inferences to be supported. Still I would conclude
that contrastivism delivers the best account of closure to
date.32
NOTES
1 The contrastive theory emerges in the following passage from Dretske:
‘‘To know that x is A is to know that x is A within a framework of rele-
vant alternatives, B, C, and D. This set of contrasts . . . serve to deﬁne
what it is that is known. . .’’ (1970, p. 1022) The theory has since been
defended by Johnsen (2001), Morton and Karjalainen (2003), Sinnott-
Armstrong (2004), and Schaﬀer (2004a, 2005b). In this vein, Johnsen
maintains: ‘‘what is known is always a contrastive proposition to the ef-
fect that P-rather-than-any-other-member-of-category-C is true. . .’’ (2001,
p. 401).
2 Dretske (1970), Nozick (1981), and Heller (1999a) have argued against
any form of closure. I will not be addressing their arguments.
3 Hintikka (1962) treats epistemic logic via the S4 axioms:
D: Ks(p1 ﬁ p2) ﬁ (Ksp1 ﬁ Ksp2)
T: Ksp ﬁ p
B: Ksp ﬁ KKsp
2 follows from D. (Proof: suppose Ksp1 and Ks(p1 ﬁ p2). From
Ks(p1 ﬁ p2) and D, we get Ksp1 ﬁ Ksp2. From this and Ksp1 we get
Ksp2. So (Ksp1 & Ks(p1 ﬁ p2)) ﬁ Ksp2.) Thus 2 is a consequence of
modeling epistemic logic as a normal modal system, for which the distri-
bution axioms hold.
4 Complication: C3 is not perfectly satisﬁed with 2 (and likewise for all
subsequent schemata), since one can fail to know that one is not a brain-
in-a-vat and still know that one has hands, if one does not see the entail-
ment relation here. But this is the right result. Really the conjunction is
only abominable for the subject who sees the connection between handed-
ness and not being envatted. The abominable conjunction can hold true
of abominable reasoners.
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5 The idea of position to know is invoked in Cohen (1999, p. 84). The
understanding of position-to-know as only needing a belief-based-on-com-
petent-deduction-while-retaining-knowledge-of-the-premises in order to
know, is drawn from Williamson (2000) and Hawthorne (2004). This rep-
resents the state-of-the-art for binary closure.
6 Dretske rejects closure for essentially this reason. According to Dre-
tske, one should be able to know that the animal is a zebra, without being
in position to know that the animal is not a cleverly painted mule. Of
course, most binary theorists will have already accustomed themselves to
accepting that one can know that one is not a brain-in-a-vat, and that
one can know that the animal is not a cleverly painted mule. But I think
this should be reckoned a counterintuitive consequence.
7 For instance, Lewis writes: ‘‘Holmes knows whether … if and only if
he knows the true one of the alternatives presented by the whether-
clause, whichever one that is.’’ (1998, p. 45) This is an instance of the
standard binary view of knowledge-wh constructions. Here Higginbotham
provides the rule: ‘‘know(x,^p)M($p) (know(x,p) & p answers p)’’ (1982,
p. 194). See Schaﬀer (forthcoming) for further discussion.
8 The idea of closure for ﬁxed alternatives is due to Stine (1976), and
has been upheld by leading contextualists since, including Cohen (1988),
DeRose (1995), and Lewis (1996).
9 Heller is explicit here: ‘‘What contextualism tell us is that knowledge
refers to diﬀerent properties in diﬀerent contexts.’’ (1999b, p. 115) And:
‘‘Every selection of worlds deﬁnes a speciﬁc epistemic property. It is these
various properties that are the possible referents for the term knowl-
edge.’’ (1999b, p. 117) See Schaﬀer 2004b (§2) for further discussion.
10 The understanding of contextualist closure via 6 is contentious in two
main respects. First, not all contextualists will want to index to relevant
alternatives. Some contextualists, such as Cohen 1999, will prefer to index
to epistemic standards (which concern the degree of evidence suﬃcient to
satisfy justiﬁed). So this sort of contextualist might replace 6 with:
ð6sÞ ðKssp1 & ðp1 ! p2ÞÞ ! Kssp2
Where S denotes an epistemic standard. 6s will function roughly equiva-
lently to 6 from the perspective of the adequacy conditions of the main
text, save that it will render the satisfaction of C9 more mysterious (see
footnote 11). In the main text I will continue to presume that the contex-
tualist is a relevant alternatives theorist. For arguments in favor of the
relevant alternatives style of contextualism, see Schaﬀer (2005a).
The second respect in which the understanding of contextualism in 6 is
contentious is that some contextualists (Cohen, 1999, p. 61) will also
count ternary theories (including contrastivism) as forms of contextual-
ism. So this sort of theorist might count the following as a variant form
of contextualism:
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ð6tÞ ðKsp1R & ðp1 ! p2ÞÞ ! Ksp2R
By treating the contrast proposition q as the disjunction of the relevant
alternatives in R, one can see that 6t is equivalent to the following con-
trastive schema (which is a simpliﬁed version of Expand-p: §5):
ð6cÞ ðKsp1q & ðp1 ! p2ÞÞ ! Ksp2q
Or, replacing relevant alternatives in 6t with standards:
ð6tsÞ ðKsp1S & ðp1 ! p2ÞÞ ! Ksp2S
The issue of what counts as contextualism here is purely terminological.
I am interested in distinguishing between (i) the pluralist view that there
are many binary K relations (in 6 and 6s), and (ii) the ternarist view that
there is only one ternary K relation (in 6t, 6c, and 6ts). I am using con-
textualism to cover (i) and reserving contrastivism to cover the case of
(ii) where the third argument place is a contrast slot. The philosopher
who prefers a more general construal of contextualism is welcome to re-
gard all these theories as species of contextualism (she might then distin-
guish pluralist contextualism from contrastivist contextualism). I only
ask that she mark the distinction here, in whatever terminology she pre-
fers.
11 Though it is not obvious that the contextualist is entitled to this. For
instance, if the contextualist follows anything like the relevance rules of
Lewis (1996), then what her rules deliver will not match what the whe-
ther-clause queries (Schaﬀer, 2004a). While if the contextualist prefers to
index to epistemic standards (see footnote 10), then she will need to forge
a connection between the alternatives of the whether-question and the
standards. It is not at all obvious how this would go. I will waive this
concern in the main text.
12 The best the contextualist can do is to rig the rules of relevance to
create the appearance of modesty, by having all assertions of modest
knowledge set the context to a dogmatic epistemic relation KR1, and all
assertions of modest ignorance set the context to a skeptical epistemic
relation KR2.
13 Here I am drawing on Heller (1999a) and Kvanvig (manuscript). For
Heller, the resulting cheap knowledge constitutes a reason to discard
closure entirely. For Kvanvig, it constitutes a decisive objection to con-
textualism and contrastivism alike. Kvanvig gives the case where s
knows that Fido is a dog rather than a cat, claims that closure should
allow s to know that Fido is an animal rather than a cat, and charges
that the contrastivist can make no sense of this. My reply is that con-
trastive closure (as formulated below: §7) in fact does not allow s to
know that Fido is an animal rather than a cat. This is the right result,
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since such a state is indeed nonsensical: being an animal does not con-
trast with being a cat.
14 Here I am adding the assumption that multi-premise closure should
hold. I take the example in the main text to illustrate the plausibility of
this assumption. For further defense see Hawthorne (2004, pp. 46–50).
15 The problem is that the R-subscripts are blocking what would other-
wise be valid inferences. That is, the inferences in C10–C12 are valid un-
der the binary closure schema 3. With 3, C10 becomes the valid
inference from Ksp to Esp; C11 becomes the valid multi-premise infer-
ence from (Ksp & Ksq) to Es(p&q); and C12 becomes the valid infer-
ence from (Ksp & Ksp) to Esp. Thus 6 cannot do the work that 3 does.
The contextualist needs to regain these lost inferences.
16 The association of questions with multiple-choice slates is known as
Hamblins dictum (Hamblin, 1958), and is implemented in Belnap and
Steels (1976) erotetic logic, and maintained in the partition semantics of
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1997).
17 If the question Q has more than two answers, KspQ contains more
information than Kspq, since Q partitions the contrasts, while q lumps
them into one big disjunction. But this additional information plays no
epistemic role. All the alternatives must be eliminated, however they are
partitioned.
18 The strategy of modeling contexts in terms of sets of alternatives is
due to Stalnaker (1999a, b). For general linguistic evidence that the con-
versational score includes an entry for question under discussion, see Lev-
inson (1983) and Ginzburg (1996).
19 When a knowledge ascription is explicit as to the value of q, via
such mechanisms as explicit ‘‘rather than’’-clauses, interrogative comple-
ments (including knowledge-whether constructions), or contrastive stress,
q is to be set to its explicit value. Note that most knowledge ascriptions
involve interrogative complements. Here are some common examples:
‘‘I know what time it is,’’ ‘‘You know who wrote the paper,’’ and ‘‘She
knows where to go.’’ Note also that most spoken knowledge ascriptions
with declarative complements feature contrastive stress. Thus compare:
‘‘I know that John kissed Mary,’’ ‘‘I know that John kissed Mary,’’
‘‘I know that John kissed Mary.’’ The unstressed binary form, as in
‘‘I know that John kissed Mary,’’ thus seems relatively rare. Most
ordinary knowledge ascriptions are explicitly contrastive.
20 As the referee for Philosophical Studies noted, one might also want
some positive grounds for the remaining option. If so, one should take
Espq to require both the elimination of q, and some positive grounds
for p (see Schaﬀer, 2005b, §4). This would require more complicated
diagrams, to encode the distinction between merely uneliminated versus
positively supported cells. I would reach the same conclusions, but only
given two further assumptions: (i) some positive support for a region
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entails some positive support for its super-regions, and (ii) some positive
support for two compatible regions entails some positive support for
their intersection. In the main text, I will work with the simpler treat-
ment.
21 Proof: Let p1 be an uneliminated region and let p2 be a super-region
of p1. Since p1 is uneliminated, there is at least one possibility w in p1
which is uneliminated. Since p2 is a super-region of p1, and w is in p1, it
follows that w is in p2. So there is at least one possibility in p2 which is
uneliminated, namely w. So p2 is an uneliminated region.
22 What if p expands only to partially overlap q? Intuitively, if I know
that the murderer is Scarlet rather than Peacock or Mustard, then I am
in position to know that the murderer is (Scarlet or Peacock), rather
than Mustard. This inference is allowed via two steps. First (as will
emerge below), one can contract q. So if one knows that the murderer
is Scarlet rather than Peacock or Mustard, one can know that the mur-
derer is Scarlet rather than Mustard. One can then expand p, to know
that the murderer is (Scarlet or Peacock), rather than Mustard. Note
that this will only work for partial overlap (as it should). In cases where
p expands to swallow q completely, no contraction of q short of [ will
allow for subsequent p expansion without overlap. And (as per below) it
is a constraint on q-contraction that q remain nonempty.
23 Q5 is rather what is called a merely rhetorical question. In only
allowing one option, it does not call for an answer. Rather its discourse
function is that of a (veiled) assertion.
24 Proof: Let q1 be an eliminated region and let q2 be a subregion of
q1. Since q1 is eliminated, every possibility w in q1 is eliminated. Since q2
is a subregion of q1, every possibility in q2 is a possibility in q1, and is
thus eliminated. So q2 is an eliminated region.
25 Proof: Given Ksp1(q1 m q2) and factivity, it follows that a (the actual
world) 2 {p1}. Likewise, given Ksp2(q1 m q2) and factivity, it follows that
a 2 {p1}. So a 2{p1} \ {p2}, so fp1g \ fp2g 6¼ [:
26 Proof: From the previous proof, we have. a 2{p1} \ {p2} But a is
uneliminated by deﬁnition (Lewis, 1996), so there is an uneliminated
possibility in {p1} \ {p2}, so {p1} \ {p2} is an uneliminated region.
27 I have diagrammed the case where neither p1 nor p2 is a part of the
other. But the same point holds if either is a part of the other. Actually
the result will be trivial in that case, since the Intersect-p rule (below)
will output knowledge of the part, which will be the same bit of knowl-
edge as was originally supposed. (That is, if p1 is a part of p2, then
Intersect-p will output Ksp1q, which is just the ﬁrst supposition.)
28 Though here the possible world treatment of propositions goes
awry, since mathematical propositions hold at all worlds or none. This
is a problem for everyone. I take no position here on how to solve it
here.
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29 Likewise for Kvanvigs example (as per footnote 13), one cannot use
knowledge that Fido is a dog rather than a cat, to come to know that
Fido is an animal rather than a cat. After all, ‘‘Is Fido an animal or a
cat?’’ does not constitute a genuine question. And the state of knowing
whether Fido is an animal or a cat does not constitute a genuine state.
30 Complication: q-expansion is permitted in the combined case, via
Union-q. In order to use Union-q to replace ones modest knowledge
that one has hands rather than stumps, with immodest knowledge that
one has hands rather than vat-images of hands, one would need a sec-
ond piece of knowledge. This second piece of knowledge would need to
be knowledge that one has hands rather than q2, where q12q2 would be
the brain-in-a-vat possibility (or a superset thereof, with Contract-q then
being applied to pare down to the brain-in-a-vat possibility). So q2
would need to contain the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis. But that would
make it ineliminable. Thus no such second piece of knowledge exists.
31 Similar comments apply to Dretskes example (as per footnote 6).
One can know that the animal is a zebra rather than a normal mule,
and not know that the animal is a zebra rather than a cleverly painted
mule. Further, one can know whether the animal is a zebra or a normal
mule, and not know whether the animal is a zebra or a painted mule.
32 Thanks to Martijn Blaauw, Stewart Cohen, Bjørn Jespersen, Jonathan
Kvanvig, Ram Neta, the referee for Philosophical Studies, and the audience
for the Contextualism Conference at the Free University of Amsterdam.
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